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PEOPLE

v.

DAUGHERTY

[40 C.2d

[Crim. No. 5366. In Bank. May 5, 1953.]
THE PEOPIJE, Hespondent, v. JOSEPH A. DAUGHEHTY,
Appellant.
[1] Homicide-Evidence.-A conviction of first degree murder is
sustained by evidence that defendant threatened to do things
to his wife because he thought she was disloyal to him, that
a few hours before the crime he told a cab driver, after
visiting his wife, "she thinks she is smart but I will show her,"
that later he returned to his wife's house, severed the telephone line on the outside of the house, forced an entry, displayed a hunting knife, pursued her from the house into the
yard and fatally stabbed her, and that on his arrest he told an
officer, "The slut, I fixed her."
[2] Criminal Law-Appeal-Questions of Law and Fact-Degree
of Offense.-Rule that where evidence is open to two equally
reasonable constructions, one pointing to guilt of a higher
degree of crime, and the other to guilt of a lesser degree, the
court must adopt the theory pointing to guilt of the lesser
degree, is not correct when applied to consideration of case by
an appellate court, but applies to the trier of fact only. (Disapproving People v. Jiminez, 95 Cal.App.2d 840, 214 P.2d 15.)
[3] Id.-New Trial-Hearing and Determination: Appeal-Reduction of Punishment Imposed.-In neither a hearing on a motion for new trial nor on appeal may the court reduce the
degree of the crime unless the evidence is legally insufficient
to support the higher degree of which defendant was convicted,
and in determining that. question the evidence, even if circumstantial, is not weighed. (See Pen. Code, §§ 1181(6),
1260.)
[ 4] !d.-Appeal-Questions of Law and Fact-Reasonable Doubt.
-The test on appeal is whether there is substantial evidence
to support the conclusion of the trier of fact, and not whether
guilt is established beyond a reasonable doubt.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Homicide, § 145(2); [2, 5] Criminal
Law, § 1309; [3] Criminal Law, §§ 969, 1446; [4] Criminal Law,
§ 1314; [6] Criminal Law,§ 1446; [7, 8] Homicide,§ 15; [9] Homicide, § 145(3); [10, 12] Criminal Law, § 951; [11] Criminal Law,
§ 1339(1); [13] Jury, § 108(5); [14] Jury, § 108; [15] Homicide,
§ 161; [16] Criminal Law, § 329(1); [17] Criminal Law, § 235(1);
[18] Criminal Law,§ 28; [19] Criminal Law,§ 1477; [20, 21] Criminal Law, § 856; [22] Homicide, § 185; [23] Criminal Law, § 766;
[24] Homicide, § 197; [25] Criminal Law, § 363; [26] Homicide,
§ 179(5).
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--------------------

[51 !d.-Appeal-Questions of Law and Fact.--An appellate court
will not determine the weight of the evidence, but will decide
only whether on the face of the evidence it can be held that
sufficient facts could not have been found by the jury to warrant the inference of guilt.
[6] !d.-Appeal-Reduction of Punishment Imposed.--An appellate court cannot reduce the degree of a crime if there is
substantial evidence to support the finding of a higher degree.
[7] Homicide-Murder-First Degree-Killing by Torture.-Murder is perpetrated by torture when the assailant's intent is
to cause cruel suffering on the part of the object of the attack,
either for the purpose of revenge, extortion, persuasion, or
to satisfy some other untoward propensity.
[8] !d.-Murder-First Degree-Killing by Torture.-The manner
of killing does not necessarily establish torture.
[9] Id.-Evidence-Torture.-Evidence that defendant had threatened to do things to his wife because he considered that she
had been unfaithful to him, that his remarks both before
and after he killed her indicated not only an intent to kill,
but also a wish to seek vengeance on her so as to cause her
to suffer, that at the time of the killing he was armed with
a knife and pursued her from the house into the yard, that
the size of the area where the blood was found indicated that
his pursuit and stabbing of her covered an appreciable time,
that dirt-filled abrasions of her thigh indicated that he must
have dragged her along the ground, and that when she was
lying on the ground he stood over her and kicked her, sustains
conclusion of jury that murder was perpetrated by torture.
[10] Criminal Law-New Trial-Misconduct of Jury.-Alleged
false statement of juror on her voir dire examination that she
did not know defendant's counsel who conducted trial is not
ground for a new trial, and in any event is not prejudicial to defendant, where there is some doubt as to whether the juror
was the same person to whom letters of a brother of one of
defendant's counsel were sent, the juror had no reason to
believe that such brother was a partner in the law firm conducting the defense, the letters do not necessarily indicate
that the juror would be angered with such brother, and the
juror had given her sworn statement that she would be impartial.
[11] !d.-Appeal-Questions of Law and Fact-Findings on Motion for New Trial.-Where affidavit of juror on motion for
new trial creates a conflict with an inference from a certain
conversation that she had prejudged the case, trial court's
[7] See Cal.Jur., Homicide, § 12 et seq.; Am.Jur., Homicide, § 15.
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resolution of that conflict against defendant is binding on
a reviewing court.
[12] Id.-New Trial-Misconduct of Jury.-Statement by juror in
answer to question as to how she arrived at verdict so quickly,
"Well, we already knew it," does not necessarily indicate a
prejudgment of the case, as a basis for a new trial, since she
may merely have meant that a short time after the case was
submitted to the jury it knew how it felt about the matter.
[13] Jury-Challenges for Cause-Review-Adjudication on Ability to Disregard Opinion.-Challenge of a juror for actual
bias for opinion formed from reading a newspaper is properly
denied under Pen. Code, § 1076, in view of juror's affirmative
reply to court's question whether he could act fairly and impartially in the light of the evidence received.
[14] !d.-Challenges for Cause-Review-Conclusiveness of Adjudication.-H challenged juror's testimony with respect to
test regarding his impartiality despite opinion formed from
reading newspaper is conflicting, trial court's resolution of
that conflict is binding on an appellate court.
[15] Homicide-Trial-Fairness.-Bias and prejudice of the jury
is not established by the fact that the jury reached a verdict
of guilty of first degree murder in an hour and a quarter
where, although the record consists of some 1,274 pages,
there was no question that defendant killed his wife, and the
evidence is adequate to show torture, premeditation, and that
his mind was not so affected by alcohol and illness as to preclude him from forming the requisite intent.
[16] Criminal Law-Conduct of Judge or Court-Particular Remarks.-Trial court was not guilty of misconduct which deprived defendant of a fair trial on the issue of sanity in a
homicide case because immediately after jury brought in verdict that defendant was guilty of first degree murder the
court remarked that the jury discharged its duty conscientiously and "in my opinion, as the evidence i:h the case warranted," and because the last witness to testify on issue of
defendant's guilt was the People's rebuttal witness who
testified that defendant had the mental capacity to form an
intent and was capable of premeditation, where both at the
beginning and at the end of the trial the court told the jury
that they were the sole judges of the evidence and of the
credibility of witnesses, and where other doctors testified that
defendant was sane.
[17] !d.-Separate Proceeding on Issue of Insanity.-Pen. Code,
§§ 1016, 1026, providing for a double plea of not guilty and
not guilty by reason of insanity and a bifurcated trial on the
issues, do not violate the due process clauses of the federal
and state Constitutions.
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[18] Id.-Ment.al Condition-Sanity.-Legal sanity, in a criminal
case, means reasoning capacity sufficient to distinguish between right and wrong as to the particular act the accused
is doing, and knowledge and consciousness that what he is
doing is wrong and criminal and will subject him to punishment.
[19] Id.- Punishment- Cruel or Unusual Punishments.- Pen.
Code, § 3604, providing that punishment of death shall be
inflicted by the administration of "a lethal gas," is not invalid
as permitting the imposition of cruel and unusual punishment
contrary to the federal Constitution.
[20] !d.-Instructions-Reasonable Doubt.-An instruction in a
homicide ease on reasonable doubt in the language of Pen.
Code, § 1096, and stating that the plea of not guilty is
a denial by defendant of each and every element of the offense
charged, that the duty is on the prosecution to prove every
fact necessary to constitute the crime, that guilt must be
established beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant's plea
of not guilty puts in issue every fact alleged in the indictment
and every material element of the crime, that in every crime
there must exist a union or joint operation of act and intent,
that specific intent is an element of the offense charged,
and presents a question of fact which must be proved like
any other fact in the case, etc., sufficiently advises the jury
that not only the crime but also the intent must be proved
beyond a reasonable doubt.
[21] !d.-Instructions-Reasonable Doubt.-Unde~: the statute no
instruction on reasonable doubt other than that specified in
Pen. Code, § 1096, need be given. (Pen Code, § 1096a.)
[22] Homicide-Instructions-Murder-Torture.-In a homicide
case, instructions on torture in the language of a Supreme
Court decision defining torture are proper.
[23] Criminal Law-Instructions-Insanity.-On a trial of a plea
of not guilty by reason of insanity, an instruction that defendant need not prove his insanity beyond a reasonable
doubt but need only prove it by a preponderance of the evidence, defining the latter clause, is correct.
[24] Homicide-Instructions-Insanity.-An instruction in the insanity stage of a homicide trial, that "the burden on the
prosecution of proving the sanity of the defendant at the
time of the commission of the crime of which he has been
found guilty, namely, murder of the first degree, beyond a
reasonable doubt, is met by the presumption of sanity, and
[18] Subnormal mentality as defense to crime, note, 44 A.L.R.
.584. See, also, Cal.Jur., Criminal Law, § 21; Am.Jur., Criminal
Law, §§ 33, 40.
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the burden of establishing the defense of insanity of the
defendant is upon him, to establish such insanity at the time
of the commission of the crime of which he has been convicted,
by a preponderance of the evidence," while confusing and
should not have been given, may reasonably be interpreted to
mean that even though the prosecution was relieved of proving
sanity beyond a reasonable doubt, yet defendant could establish his insanity by a preponderance of the evidence.
[25] Criminal Law- Burden of Proof- Insanity.- While the
burden of proving sanity is on the prosecution in the sanity
stage of a criminal trial, the burden is on defendant to prove
insanity by a preponderance of the evidence.
[26] Homicide-Instructions-Deliberation and Intent.-Instructions on deliberation and intent are proper in a homicide case
where the jury is told that to constitute first degree murder
the killing must be by torture as defined, or wilful act
accompanied by malice together with a clear and deliberate
intent to take life, that the intent must be the result of
deliberation and must be formed on preexisting reflection and
not under heat of passion or such other condition as to preclude deliberation, that the true test is not the duration of
time but rather the extent of the reflection, and that to
constitute a deliberate and premeditated killing, the slayer
must weigh and consider the question of killing and the
reasons for and against such a choice and, having in mind the
consequences, decide to and commit the unlawful act causing
death.

APPEAL (automatically taken under Pen. Code, § 1239)
from a judgment of the Superior Court of Sonoma County
and from an order denying a new trial. Donald Geary, Judge.
Affirmed.
Prosecution for murder.
degree murder, affirmed.

.Judgment of conviction of first

Mancuso, Herron & Winn and ,John Wynne Herron for
Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, Doris H. Maier and
Leo V. Mcinnis, Deputy Attorneys General, and Joseph
Maddux, District Attorney (Sonoma), for Respondent.
CAR'rER, J.-'rhis case comes to us by automatic appeal
from a judgment of conviction of first degree murder imposing the death penalty, finding defendant sane, and from
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an order denying a new trial. Defendant made the twofold
plea of not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity.
Defendant is a man about 50 years of age. He married
.B-,lorena Daugherty, the victim of the homicide, in 1933, and
they had five children, Barbara, Michael, Wanda, Margaret,
and Jerry. The killing occurred in the early morning hours of
February 28, 1952. Defendant did not testify at the trial
and there was little dispute that he killed his wife Florena,
the main contention being that his mind had so deteriorated
from illness and the consumption of alcoholic beverages that
he was incapable of premeditation or of forming the intent to
commit murder.
[1] The homicide took place at the Daugherty family home
on the outskirts of Santa Rosa, California. Defendant had
not been living at the home for about a month before the
time of the crime, having moved to an apartment in town.
Prior to the homicide the relation between defendant and
Flo rena had been strained. Barbara, the 17 -year-old daughter
of the couple, testified that for several years prior thereto
they had engaged in constant quarrels and arguments with
the defendant accusing Florena of infidelity. On one occasion
in 1951, defendant struck Barbara and was arrested therefor.
He had made threats against Florena, stating that "he would
come back and get us.'' In December, 1951, defendant had
been drinking heavily. He seemed to think his wife was disloyal to him, and while armed with a gun, went looking for
her at the house of a tenant nearby his own home. He then
fired some shots in the air. Early in 1952, defendant commenced a divorce action against Florena and on the morning
of February 27, 1952, the day before the night of the crime,
obtained an interlocutory decree by default. He attended to
his business, seeming normal, and left a beauty shop owned
by him at 4 :30 p. m. From about 6 :30 to 10 :00 p. m. he was
with Mrs. Case, an employee, and a friend, Oliver, at either
Mrs. Case's apartment or his own, where he consumed considerable whiskey but appeared to be rational. Several witnesses saw defendant between 10 and 11 :30 p. m., and they
testified that he had consumed whiskey, some of them said he
was drunk, others said that he was not drunk but was in
high spirits. Between 11 and 11 :30 p. m. he called a taxi
driver by the name of Bickel from a cafe in Santa Rosa.
Bickel drove him to the Daugherty home. Bickel testified that
defendant was in good spirits and happy drunk but acted
rationally. While he waited for defendant outside the
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Daugherty home, he saw the defendant and Florena in the
dining room. Defendant waived a white piece of paper at her
(inferentially the interlocutory divorce decree) and she tried
to push him out of the house. Defendant left and on returning to the cab stated : ''The God damned dirty bitch, she
thinks she is smart but I will show her" that he had gotten
his ''clincher'' today and he ''just went out there to show
her my clincher.'' Bickel returned the defe~tdant to his apartment at about 11 :30 p. m. Between 1 :30 and 2 :30 a. m. defendant was observed endeavoring to back his car out of his
garage and the observer said he was drunk. Defendant called
on Mrs. Case and she also considered him drunk. From the
testimony of various witnesses and the permissible inferences
therefrom, defendant then drove to the Daugherty home and
parked his car. Florena, and all the children with the exception of Barbara, were at home. Defendant severed the
telephone line on the outside of the house and forced an
entry. Florena locked herself in the bedroom but at his
insistence let him in. Defendant was holding a hunting knife
in his upraised hand, evidently having come ..to the house
armed with it, but put it in his belt at her request. She fled
from the house to the yard and he followed her. While there
were no eyewitnesses to the crime, he was observed kicking
her while she was lying in the yard and he was standing over
her. Defendant left and the children, at Florena 's request,
went to summon help. A neighbor responded, and saw Florena
lying on her back in the yard, nude. She was alive and conscious. He drove to town for the police and on their arrival
she was still alive, lying nude, her body having blood on it.
An ambulance was summoned, and she was taken away. There
was blood at various places in the yard and at the door
of the house. There were abrasions on her thigh with particles
of dirt therein, indicating she had been dragged. Her body
contained numerous stab wounds, including some on the upper
part of her arm, shoulder, near hip joint, abdomen and forearm. The cartilage of her nose was broken. The fatal wound
was on the side of the left breast and was 3 inches wide and
6 inches deep. The evidence showed that the wound had
penetrated the heart and would cause death from internal
hemorrhage. In addition to the blood in the yard, which
covered a considerable area, a blood-stained hunting knife
and her torn nightdress were found. A knife scabbard whose
inside configuration fit the knife was found at defendant's
apartment.
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,Just prior to his arrest (about 3 a. m. on the day of the
crime), defendant made telephone calls to several different
persons to whom he stated that he had killed his wife. At
the time of his arrest in his office, there was blood on his shirt
and pants and about his office and car. Although defendant
refused to make a formal statement to the peace officers, when
he was asked what had happened at the home place, he
stopped, gritted his teeth, and shook his fist at the ground,
and said: ''I stood there and watched the dirty son of a bitch
die; I couldn't take it any longer." ·when taken to the
sheriff's office and examined, he had the divorce decree on
his person. He did not appear drunk and while there he told
an officer, ''I told her not to push me too far; I told her not
to push me too far or I would fix her and I did. . . . 'fhe slut,
I fixed her."
'fhe foregoing summary of the evidence is clearly sufficient
to establish intentional, premeditated and deliberate murder,
or murder in the first degree.
As before stated, the main defense at the trial was that
defendant was so deranged by alcohol and illness, that he
was incapable of forming an intent or of premeditation.
There was evidence, as above seen, that he was intoxicated on
the night in question and evidence to the contrary. He had
witnesses in his defense who testified to his intoxication then,
and overindulgence in alcohol for a considerable period of
time prior thereto, coupled with his suffering from Buerger's
Disease and other ailments; that defendant had changed and
was sullen and morose. His personal physician testified that
defendant was suffering from heart disease, ulcers, bladder
trouble, Buerger's Disease and chronic alcoholism and, because of those things, that when he committed the offense he
did not have the capacity to form the intent to commit
murder. However, on rebuttal, the prosecution called Dr.
Toller, a psychiatrist, who testified that he did have such
capacity as shown by his activities on the night in question.
Defendant relies on recent cases by this court in support
of his contention that there was insufficient evidence to establish premeditation as lately defined by this court. The facts
in those cases are not comparable to the one here presented.
Defendant stresses the language in People v. Howard, 211
Cal. 322 [295 P. 333, 71 A.L.R. 1385], that there was no evidence of the surrounding circumstances at the time of the
killing. Here, as above outlined, we have such evidence and,
together with the inferences to be drawn therefrom, it is
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sufficient. In People v. Holt, 25 Cal.2d 59 [153 P.2d 21], a
previous threat to kill was held insufficient but that was in
the background of defendant's testimony that the deceased
was advancing upon him when he shot him and he fired but
one shot which was not immediately fatal. Here many wounds
were inflicted and defendant had pursued Florena. Reliance is also placed on People v. Thomas, 25 Cal.2d 880 [156
P.2d 7], but there the court held the evidence sufficient.
Evidence such as exists here was not present in People v.
Bender, 27 Cal.2d 164 [163 P.2d 8], where the only "rationale" was a "tempestuous quarrel, hot anger and a violent
killing." Special reliance is placed upon People v. Jiminez,
95 Cal.App.2d 840 [214 P.2d 15]. In that case there was
not all the evidence of threats and statements made by defendant, as well as evidence of torture, shown by the record
here. [2] The statement therein that courts are bound by
the rule that where evidence is open to two equally reasonable constructions, one of which points to the guilt of defendant of a higher degree of crime, and the other to his guilt
of a lesser degree, the court must adopt the theory pointing
to guilt of the lesser degree, is not a correct statement of
law when applied to the consideration of a case by an appellate court. That rule applies to the trier of fact only,
be it jury or trial court, the same as doet! section 1096 which
deals with reasonable doubt. The cobrt in the Jiminez
case cites section 1097 of the Penal Code' which reads: "When
it appears that the defendant has coqj.mitted a public offense,
and there is reasonable ground of doubt in which of two or
more degrees he is guilty, he can be convicted of the lowest
of such degrees only." But that section is in a chapter of
the code dealing with the trial of a case. Also cited in the
Jiminez case are People v. Golembiewski, 25 Cal.App.2d 115
[76 P.2d 717] and People v. Daniel, 65 Cal.App.2d 622 [151
P.2d 275]. In the Golembiewski case there was no evidence
of the higher offense and the court was speaking of the duty
of the trier of fact. [3] The Daniel case relied on the rule
in connection with the power of the trial court to reduce the
degree of the crime under section 1181 ( 6) of the Penal Code,
but we held the rule was the same under that section ( 1181 ( 6) )
as it was under section 1260 of the Penal Code and in neither
case may the court reduce the degree of the crime unless the
evidence is legally insufficient to support the higher degree
of which defendant was convicted, and in determining that
question, the evidence, even if circumstantial, is not weighed.
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(People v. Odle, 37 Cal.2d 52 [230 P.2d 345] .) [4] The test
on appeal is whether there is substantial evidence to support
the conclusion of the trier of fact. It is not whether guilt
is established beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Stephens,
66 Cal.App.2d 755 [152 P.2d 1019]; People v. Wright, 94
Cal.App.2d 70 [210 P.2d 263] .) [5] The rule is stated in
People v. Newland, 15 Cal.2d 678, 681 [104 P.2d 778], rejecting a contrary statement in People v. Lamson, 1 Ca1.2d 648
[36 P.2d 361] and People v. Staples, 149 Cal. 405 [86 P. 886] :
''The rule applicable where there is evidence, circumstantial
or otherwise, that a crime has been committed and that the
defendant was the perpetrator thereof, has been many times
reiterated by the reviewing courts of this state as follows-:
The court on appeal 'will not attempt to determine the weight
of the evidence, but will decide only whether upon the face
of the evidence it can be held that sufficient facts could not
have been found by the jury to warrant the inference of guilt.
For it is the function of the jury in the first instance, and
of the trial court after verdict, to determine what facts are
established by the evidence, and before the verdict of the jury,
which has been approved by the trial court, can be set aside
on appeal upon the ground' of insufficiency of the evidence,
'it must be made clearly to appear that upon no hypothesis
whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support
the conclusion reached in the court below. The determination of a charge in a criminal case involves proof of two distinct propositions: First, that the offense charged was committed, and second, that it was perpetrated by the person or
persons accused thereof. . . . We must assume in favor of
the verdict the existence of every fact which the jury could
have reasonably deduced from the evidence, and then determine whether such facts are sufficient to support the verdict.'
If the circumstances reasonably justify the verdict of the jury,
the opinion of the reviewing court that those circumstances
might also reasonably be reconciled with the innocence of the
defendant will not warrant interference with the determination of the jury. (People v. Perkins. 8 Ca1.(2d) 502 [66 P.2d
631] ; . . . ) In the Perkins case this court expressly rejected
the application of the statement from the Staples case to a
situation which involved only circumstantial evidence. As
pointed out by the court the rule that the circumstances relied upon by the prosecution must be consistent with guilt
and inconsistent with an hypothesis of innocence is a rule of
instruction for the jury, and is not the rule for the guidance

886

PEOPLE V. DAUGHERTY

[40 C.2d

of the court on review. It said : 'The rule above announced
does no more than to instruct the jury that, if a reasonable
doubt is created in their minds for any reason, they must
acquit the defendant. But, where the jury rejects the hypothesis pointing to innocence by its verdict, and there is evidence
to support the implied finding of guilt as the more reasonable
of the two hypotheses, this court is bound by the finding of
the jury.' " That rule has been consistently followed. (People v. Reed, 38 Cal.2d 423 [240 P.2d 590] ; People v. Cullen,
37 Cal.2d 614 [234 P .2d l] ; People v. Jones, 36 Cal.2d 37.3
[224 P.2d 353] ; see cases collected and discussion, 4 Cal.Jur.
10-Yr.Supp. [1943 Rev.], pp. 967-971.) [6] Without doubt
the same rule applies in determining whether the evidence
does or does not support a conviction of a higher degree of
a crime, and an appellate court cannot reduce the degree if
there is substantial evidence to support the finding of a higher
degree. The same comments are applicable to the other cases
relied upon by defendant.
In connection with the claimed insufficiency of the evidence,
defendant asserts there was no evidence of torture. (Murder
committed by torture is first degree. Pen. Code, § 189.) There
was sufficient evidence from which the jury could find torture. [7] Murder is perpetrated by torture "when 'the
assailant's intent was to cause cruel suffering on the part of
the object of the attack, either for the purpose of revenge,
extortion, persuasion, or to satisfy some other untoward propensity.' (People v. Tttbby, 34 Cal.2d 72, 77 [207 P.2d 51] ;
People v. Bender, 27 Cal.2d 164, 177 [163 P.2d 8].)" (People
v. Martinez, 38 Cal.2d 556, 561 [241 P.2d 224] .) [8] The
manner of the killing does not necessarily establish torture
(see People v. Tubby, 34 Cal.2d 72 [207 P.2d 51]). [9] However, here the defendant husband threatened to do things
to the wife because he considered she had been, and was, unfaithful to him although there was no evidence to that effect.
His remarks to Bickel, the taxi driver, before the killing
jndicate as well as an intent to kill, a wish to seek vengeance
on her so as to cause her to suffer. The same is true of his
remarks after the killing. At the time of the killing he was
armed with a knife and pursued her from the house into the
yard and from the size of the area where blood was found, his
pursuit and the stabbing of her must have covered an appreciable time. He tore her nightgown from her, stabbed
her several times and, from the dirt-filled abrasions on her
thigh, must have dragged her along the ground. He evi-
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dently struck her in the face. And finally, when she was
lying on the ground but still alive, he stood over her and
kicked her. The evidence was sufficient to permit the jury
to conclude that the murder was perpetrated by torture. (See
People v. Martinez, sttpra, 38 Cal.2d 556.)
[10] On voiT' d1:r-e examination, Juror Mickelsen stated that
although she had read about the case she had formed no
opinion concerning it; had no conscientious scruples against
the death penalty, the use of intoxicating liquors, or the defense
of insanity; that she did not know Charles DeMeo, one of the
defendant's counsel, or Sullivan, defendant's other counsel,
who conducted the trial, or the district attorney and had had
no contact with any of them. In support of his motion for a
new trial, defendant produced affidavits from which it appears
that Charles DeMeo is a member of a law firm of which J. N.
DeMeo is also a member. Prior to the trial, the firm, through
J. N. DeMeo, represented one Grundstrom as plaintiff in a
divorce action. Concerning that representation and the action
taken therein, Charles DeMeo had no actual knowledge until
investigation after the trial. Grundstrom was granted a
divorce and custody of the children with right of visitation
in the defendant therein. In connection with that case, J. N.
DeMeo had written two letters to a Mrs. Peter Michelsen,
Route 4, Box 135, Petaluma, California. (The Mrs. Mickelsen
who was on the jury appears under the name of Mrs. Leda
F. Mickelsen, Bodega Highway, Route 4, Box 199, Petaluma.)
In the first letter (July 16, 1950), J. N. DeMeo wrote her
that Grundstrom had complained that she had endeavored
to entice one of the children away from him and that if she
did not desist, Grundstrom would have to forbid her seeing
the child. In the second letter (March 26, 1952) J. N. DeMeo
stated that Grundstrom had again complained; that she had
ignored the former letter, and that the child could visit her
once a week for two and one-half hours; that she was to stop
the above mentioned activities, or legal action would be taken .
.A.pparently the Mrs. Mickelsen to whom the letters were addressed was the maternal grandmother of the child. No answers
to the letters were received. It was further stated in the affidavits that had counsel known of the situation they would
have pursued an inquiry as a, basis for challenge for cause
or would have exercised a peremptory challenge against Mrs.
Mickelsen. Defendant claims that the letters would cause
Mrs. Mickelsen to be unfriendly towards the DeMeos and
that a fair trial was denied because of Mrs. Mickelsen's false
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testimony on the voir dire that she did not know and had no
eontact with any of the attorneys in the case. There may have
been some doubt as to whether Juror Mickelsen and the one to
whom the letters were sent were the same person for the names
and addresses are to some extent different. Aside from that,
however, we do not believe defendant suffered prejudice.
Mrs. Mickelsen was technically truthful in her answer that
she had no contact with any of the attorneys in the case for
she had had none with Charles DeMeo who was in court
assisting with defendant's defense. The letters were written
by J. N. DeMeo, and as far as appears, she had never seen
either of them and had no reason to believe they were partners. It is very doubtful if she realized that there was any connection between Charles DeMeo and the incident of the letters.
If anything, Charles DeMeo, as a partner, might have J. N.
DeMeo's knowledge imputed to him. The letters do not necessarily indicate that Mrs. Mickelsen would be angered with
J. N. DeMeo. A.t least not to the extent that she would carry
it over to Charles. In addition, she had given her sworn statement that she would be impartial. Moreover, she made affidavit on the motion for a new trial, ''That before being
selected as a trial juror in said cause, and while being questioned on voire dire examination, affiant stated under oath
that she had no fixed opinion regarding the merits of the case
which would prevent her from trying the case solely upon
the evidence adduced at the trial. That during the course of
the said trial affiant frequently heard the admonition of the
trial judge that the jurors should not form or express any
opinion about the merits of the case until it was finally submitted to them, and affiant hereby states that she faithfully
observed said admonition. That during the trial of the said
case and before it was finally submitted to the jury affiant
did not form or express any opinion about the merits of the
case.
''That during the trial, before it was submitted, affiant did
not, at any time, express any opinion regarding the merits of
the case, nor did affiant overhear any other member of the
jury state any such opinion.''
Further in connection with Mrs. Mickelsen, the affidavit of
one Graham was filed in which he stated that he was in the
corridor of the courthouse after the jury had reached its
verdict and had stated to Mrs. Mickelsen who was there,
" 'It seems phoney that they could get a verdict that quick
on as large a trial as that.'
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''. . . [Mrs. Mickelsen] responded: 'Why~'
''Affiant an:;;wered : 'Because he is a sick man.'
" . . . [Mrs. Mickelsen] responded: 'I am one of the jurors,
I'm sick too. I have hemorrhoids and I haven't killed anybody.'
''Affiant then said: 'How did you arrive at a verdict that
quick?'
" . . . [Mrs. Mickelsen] responded: 'Well, we already
knew it,' and then walked away.''
[11] Mrs. Mickelsen's affidavit creates a conflict with any
inference from that conversation that she had prejudged the
case for she said she had formed no opinion and the trial
court's resolution of that conflict against defendant is binding
on this court. (People v. Henderson, 79 Cal.App.2d 94 [179
P.2d 406].) [12] Moreover, her statement does not necesflarily indicate a prejudgment of the case for she may merely
have meant that a short time after the case was submitted
to the jury it knew how it felt about the matter. Nothing in
People v. Galloway, 202 Cal. 81 [259 P. 332], requires a holding of error here. There the court was concerned with the
question of whether bias on the part of a juror could be shown
when it was evinced by statements made before and during
the trial, but had been concealed by the juror on voir dire.
·whether bias was in fact shown or what its effect may have
been was not involved.
Complaint is made by the defendant in regard to Juror
Schmidt. Schmidt testified on voir dire that there was nothing in his present state of mind that wonld prevent him from
being an impartial juror except what he had read in the newspaper; that he had an opinion based solely on what he had
read in the newspaper as to the guilt or innocence of defendant, but he had an open mind and could put it aside and
be guided in his verdict solely by the evidence. On examination
by defendant's counsel he said he still had the opinion he had
formed and it would continue unless he heard evidence that
removed it; that unless he did hear evidence to remove his
opinion and some feeling of prejudice he would still have it
at the end of the trial. Defendant's challenge for cause of
Schmidt was denied, the court remarking that it did so on
the ground that the juror had said he would cast aside his
impression gained from reading the paper and determine the
case on the evidence. 'l'he court then asked Schmidt whether
he could act fairly and impartially in the light of the evidence received, to which an affirmative reply was given.
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[13] The rule is stated: '' . . . but no person shall be disqualified as a juror by reason of having formed or expressed
an opinion upon the matter or cause to be submitted to such
jury, founded upon public rumor, statements in public journals, circulars, or other literature, or common notoriety; provided, it appear to the court, upon his declaration, under oath
or otherwise, that he can and will, notwithstanding such an
opinion, act impartially and fairly upon the matters to be
submitted to him.'' (Pen. Code, § 1076.) That test was met here.
(See People v. Collins, 105 Cal. 504 [39 P. 16]; People v.
Warner, 147 Cal. 546 [82 P. 196]; People v. Wolff, 182 Cal.
728 [190 P. 22].) There is nothing in People v. Helm, 152
Cal. 532 [93 P. 99], that requires a different result. [14] Moreover, even if the juror's testimony with respect to the test is
conflicting, the trial court's resolution of that conflict is binding on the appellate court. (People v. Eudy, 12 Cal.2d 41
[82 P.2d 359].)
The trial was not fair, urges defendant, because the jury
and judge were dominated by mob psychology and were prejudiced; that the jury reached a verdict in so short a time
that it must have been prejudiced. So far as the first contention is concerned, there is nothing in the record to substantiate the charge and this is the first time the claim has
been made. Indeed, an examination of the record reveals
the opposite of defendant's contention.
[15] On the second point it may be noted that the jury
took an hour and a quarter to reach its verdict on the first
phase of the trial. While the record consists of some 1,274
pages, the defendant's only defense at the trial was, as above
stated, that defendant was so befuddled by alcohol and illness
that he could not form an intent and was incapable of premeditation or deliberation. There was no question that defendant killed Florena and the eyidence of torture and premeditation and that his mind was not so affected is adequate.
Inasmueh, however, as there were no eyewitnesses to the
killing, most of the record consists of the People's structure of
a case based on circumstantial evidence. On the record we do
not believe the time consumed in reaching the verdict was so
short as to indicate a failure to consider the evidence or of
bias or prejudice or the denial of a fair trial.
[16] It is contended that the court was guilty of miseonduct which deprived the defendant of a fair trial on the
issue of sanity. The same jury tried both sections of the trial.
Immediately after the jury returned its verdict to the court,
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the latter 1·emarked: '' I1adies and g·entlemen of the jury, this
has been a most unploasant and a most difficult duty. You
have discharged that duty conscientiously and, in rny opinion,
as the evidence in the case warranted!' (Emphasis added.)
Defendant moved for a mistrial and that the jury be diseharged and another impanelled to try the sanity issue. 'fhe
motion was denied. It is asserted that the italicized comment
was particularly prejudicial because the last witness on the
stand to testify on the issue of defendant's guilt was a Doctor
Toller, the People's rebuttal witness, who testified that defendant did have the mental capacity to form an intent and
was capable of premeditation and that the comment, in effect,
told the jury that his testimony, which was fresh in the jury's
mind, was properly believed ; that the same doctor testified
for the People that defendant was sane at the trial of the
sanity issue.
In addition to the foregoing, it should be mentioned that
at the beginning of the sanity trial, the court told the jury
that in considering the evidence, they were "the sole judges
of the evidence and of the credibility of the witnesses and
[of] the weight to be given to the evidence and testimony,
and you are to determine the issues presented upon this phase
. . . without regard to any intimation,-reputed intimation,
that may have been made heretofore concerning the determination of the issues presented upon the first phase of the case.
Tl1e defendant is entitled to your calm, unbiased and unprejudiced judgment upon the issue upon which we are now to
receive testimony. You understand that do you, ladies and
gentlemen? (.Jurors answer in affirmative.)" At the end
of that trial, the court again admonished the jury, saying ''The
Court has nothing to do with the determination of questions
of fact. Whatever the Court may have said during the progress
of the trial, and particularly what the Court may have said at
the conclusion of the first phase of this trial, or may intimate,
or have intimated, in its instructions, with respect to the
evidence, its weight, effect [sic] or sufficiency, must in no way
influence your verdict, and if there be any such intimation
the same must be wholly and completely disregarded by you.
Tf, in stating to you any proposition of law the Court has
inadvertently indicated any material fact, or facts, to have
been proved, you will disregard such intimation and draw
your own conclusions from the evidence herein. 'I'hat is a
duty resting solely upon you, ladies and gentlemen, without
intimation or guidance in any shape or manner from the
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Court." Tt should also be pointed out that on the sanity
issuP the proseeution presented, in addition to Dr. Toller,
two othm· dodor,; appointed by the court, who twice examined
defendant, and who testified he was sane. Defendant called
several relatives and intimate friends, his personal doctor, a
psyehologist, and a psychiatrist, who testified that defendant
was insane. While there was a sharp conflict in the evidence,
there was ample evidence to support the determination that
defendant was sane.
lt is doubtful that the error, if any, in the court's comment was prejudicial in view of the adequacy of the evidence, his strong admonitions to them, and the casual nature
of the remark buried as it was in the common laudatory statement regarding the performance by the jury of its duty and
the fact that it was made before the sanity hearing began.
'When we consider those circumstances together with the power
of the court to comment on the credibility of testimony provided he tells the jury it is the exclusive judge of all questions
of fact and credibility of the witnesses (Cal. Const., art. VI,
§ 19), we find no prejudicial error. (See People v. Ottey,
5 Cal.2d 714 [56 P.2d 193]; People v. Patubo, 9 Cal.2d 537
[71 P.2d 270, 113 A.L.R. 1303] ; People v. Gosden, 6 Cal.2d 14
[56 P.2d 211] ; People v. De Moss, 4 Cal.2d 469 [50 P.2d
1031]; People v. Eudy, supra, 12 Cal.2d 41.) At most the
court said that in his opinion evidence was sufficient and the
credibility of the prosecution witnesses on mental ability was
satisfactory. The trial of the sanity issue involved an issue
entirely different from the question of the capacity to form
an intent in the not guilty trial (People v. Wells, 33 Cal.2d
330 [202 P.2d 53]) and the jury was so instructed (as later
discussed). Additional witnesses were offered by both sides at
the sanity hearing.
Defendant relies upon People v. Pokrajac, 206 Cal. 259
f274 P. 63], where the court's remark, after the trial on the
not guilty plea but before the sanity trial, that the jury's verdict was ''undoubtedly'' a correct one was held prejudicial
error which had not been cured by the admonition to the
jury. The remarks there made were far stronger than those
here involved and, too, that case was decided prior to the
amendment to the Constitution in 1934, authorizing comment
on the evidence. This was pointed out in People v. Busby,
40 Cal.App,2d 193, 202 [104 P.2d 531], where, between the
sections of the trial, the court told the jury it had acted intelligently: ''Appellant contends that the language of the
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court expressed approval of the jury's verdict and had a
tendency to minimize the importance of the insanity issue.
As authority they cited People v. Pokrajac, 206 Cal. 259 [274
Pac. 63], where somewhat similar comment made by the trial
judge was held to be reversible error.
'' . . . since the Pokrajac case was reported, the amendment
to the California Constitution, permitting the trial judge to
<·omment upon the evidence.. has gone into effect. (Cal. Const.,
art. VI, sec. 19.) It has been held that this right of comment
even permits a trial judge, in proper cases, to express an
opinion as to the guilt of the defendant. (People v. Ottey,
3 Cal.(2d) 714 [56 P.(2d) 193].)
"The fact that the trial judge's remarks were made before
the trial on the insanity issue rather than during its progress,
gives rise to no distinction as the trial on the substantive
charges and the insanity issue constitute but a single trial.
(People v. Troche, 206 Cal. 35 [273 Pac. 767] .)
''The jurors were fully and correctly instructed as to the
effect that they were the sole and exclusive judges of the
effect and value of evidence and of the credibility of witnesses.
The remarks of the trial judge did not constitute reversible
error.''
[17] Defendant contends that sections 1016 and 1026 of
the Penal Code, providing for a double plea of not guilty and
not guilty by reason of insanity and a bifurcated trial on the
issues, violate the due process clauses of the Constitutions of
the United States and the State of California and that the
cases beginning with People v. Troche, 206 Cal. 35 [273 P. 767]
and People v. Leong Fook, 206 Cal. 64 [273 P. 779], to
the contrary should be overruled. (See, also, In re Slayback,
209 Cal. 480 [288 P. 769]; People v. Dias, 210 Cal. 495 [292
P. 459]; People v. D'Angelo, 13 Ca1.2d 203 [88 P.2d 708];
People v. Cordova, 14 Cal.2d :308 [94 P.2d 40] ; People v .
.lh'ng, 27 Cal.2d 44:3 [164 P.2d 487] ; People v. Wells, :3:3 Cal.
Zd ~~80 1202 P .2d 53].) We see no occasion for reconsidering
om· decisions in those cases. No new grounds are advanred.
[18] The right and wrong test of insanity is criticized as
cruel and unscientific, that it is not the common or statutory
law of this state and the cases declaring it to be the test should
be ovenuled. 'l'he most recent reaffirmation of the test was
made by this eourt in People v. Wells, supra, 33 Cal.2c1 3:30,
849: ''Commission of the overt act is conceded but criminal
g·uilt (the mental capacity to commit a criminal act) is denied
upon the sole grotmd that at the time the overt act was
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<·mnmitted the defendant was suffering such 'a defect of
reason, from disease of the mind . . . as not to know the
nature and quality of the act he was doing, or if he did know
it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong.' (7
Cal.Jur. § 21, p. 862; People v. Troche (1928), supra, 206
Cal. 35, 46.)
''. . . The standard by which the trial judge must appraise
the admissibility of evidence in every case is, of course, the
familiar 'right or wrong' standard hereinabove quoted, by
which legal insanity as a defense is gauged.
" . . . Legal sanity, in a criminal case, under our court
declared law, means 'reasoning capacity sufficient to distinguish between right and wrong as to the particular act he
is doing, knowledge and consciousness that what he is doing
is wrong and criminal and will subject him to punishment.'
(People v. Sloper (1926), 198 Cal. 238, 245 [244 P. 362],
and cases there cited.)'' That has been the rule since the first
decision in this state (People v. M'Donnell, 47 Cal. 134) and
has been followed consistently (see cases collected 7 Cal.Jur.
862-863) despite voluminous critical writings on the subject.
It is the generally accepted rule. ( 41 Am.Jur., Criminal Law,
§§ 33, 40; 44 A.L.R. 584; 22 C.J.S., Criminal Law, § 59;
Wharton's Criminal Law, §§50-52; Warren on Homicide,
§ .61.) Defendant has not offered a more workable test and
if it is to be changed his argument should be addressed to the
Legislature. Indeed, such attempts have been made without
a vail. \¥ e find no valid reason, therefore, for adopting a
different test.
[19] Section 3604 of the Penal Code provides that punishment of death shall be inflicted by the administration of ''a
lethal gas.'' Defendant contends that the provision is invalid
because of uncertainty in that it permits the imposition of
eruel and unusual punishment contrary to the federal Constitution in that the executioner could use a lethal gas which
wonld cause long and cruel suffering. It is doubtful that this
question is properly raised on this appeal since ordinarily
we are not concerned with the execution of the judgment
and there is no showing that such a gas has ever been used or
will be used in this case. In any event, the contention is satisfactorily answered in State v. Gee Jon, 46 Nev. 418 [211 P.
676, 30 A.L.R. 1443], where similar contentions and a similar
statute were involved. The court said: "But we are not prepared to say that the infliction of the death penalty by the
administration of lethal gas would of itself subject the victim
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to either pain or torture. Counsel say we must take judicial
noticr of facts and conclusions reached as the result of
scientific research, and it is insisted that from the knowledge
thus acquired we must declare that the law in question provides a cruel and inhuman method of enforcing the death
penalty. ~Without undertaking to state the limitations of the
mle invoked, we may say that if we are controlled by our
scientifi(: knowledge of the subjeet we must reject counsel 't;
contention. li'or many years animah; have been put to death
painlessly by the administration of poisonous gas. Gas has
been used for years by dental surgeons for the purpose of
extracting teeth painlessly. No doubt gas may be administered so as to produce intense suffering. It is also true
that one may be executed by hanging, shooting, or electrocution in such a bungling fashion as to produce the same result.
But this is no argument again:st execution by either method.
'' 'rhe revulsion on the part of many to the idea of execution by the administration of gas is due to an erroneous impression. The average person looks upon the use of gas with
horror, because of the experiences incident to the late war.
'fhey forget that there are many kinds of gas, ranging from
the harmless nonpoisonous tear gas, which may be used for the
quelling of a mob, and the ordinary illuminating gas, which
may produce painless death, to the highly poisonous gas which
sears and destroys everything with which it comes in contact.
It may be said to be a scientific fact that a painless death may
be caused by the administration of lethal gas. That suffering
and torture may be inflicted by its administration is no argument ag·ainst it. \V e must presume that the officials intrusted
with the infliction of the death penalty by the use of gas will
administer a gas which will produce no such results, and will
carefully avoid inflicting cruel punishment. That they may
not do so is no argument against the law.
"We think it fair to assume that our Legislature, in enacting the law in question, sought to provide a method of inflicting the death penalty in the most humane manner known
to modern science. If the argument made in behalf of the unconstitutionality of the act is sound, the Legislature can provide no method of inflicting the death penalty other than that
now in vogue. In other words, science and progress must halt
when face to face with a long-established usage. Such was not
the spirit which prompted the incorporation into our organic
law of the provision now invoked. Every enactment of our
IJegislature mnst be deemed in harmony with our constitu-
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tiona] provisiOns until the contrary clearly appears. The
IJegislature has determined that the infliction of the death
penalty by the aclministration of lethal gas is humane, and
it would indeed be not only presumptuous, but boldness on
our part, to substitute our judgment for theirs, even if we
thought differently upon the matter.
'' . . . \Ve can find no ground upon which to sustain appellants' contention . . . . Nor do we find any merit in the
contention that the act is indefinite and uncertain. It is certainly no more so than the act which it purports to amend.
Rev. Laws 1912, § 7281. That statute simply said that the punishment of death should be inflicted by hanging the defendant
by the neck until he is dead, or by shooting him, at his
election. The present statute provides that the judgment of
death shall be inflicted by the administration of lethal gas,
and that a suitable and efficient inclosure and proper means
for the administration of such gas for the purpose shall be
provided. We cannot see that any useful purpose would be
served by requiring greater detail. Certainly, the statute infringes no provision of the Constitution.''
Finally, the defendant questions the jury instructions.
[20] First, it is asserted that the instructions on reasonable
doubt at the not guilty stage of the trial were insufficient;
that the jury was not advised that each fact necessary for
the crime must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt and
particularly it was not told that intent must be so proven.
The jury was instructed that the burden of proof was on
the prosecution; that all presumptions are in favor of the
accused; that if there is a reasonable doubt as to whether
the circumstances point to defendant's guilt he should be given
the benefit of that doubt and a verdict of acquittal reached.
The court quoted section 1096 of the Penal Code which states
that the accused is presumed to be innocent, that if there is a
reasonable doubt of his guilt he is entitled to an acquittal,
and defines reasonable doubt. The jury was instructed that
the plea of not guilty is a denial by him of each and every
element of the offense charged; that the duty is on the prosecution to prove every fact necessary to constitute the crime;
that in a criminal, as distinguished from a civil case, guilt
must be established beyond a reasonable doubt; that defendant's plea of not guilty puts in issue every fact alleged
in the indictment and every material element of the crime;
that he may rest on that denial and if the evidence did not
satisfy it of defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt he
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-----should he a(•quitte(1; that in every crime thcl'C must exiflt a
11nion, or joint OJWra1ion of ad atHl inlent (Pm1.
~ 20)
and that a pnrson has no (•ap;wit.\· to ·~ommit a erimn if it
was through aeeidellt aJl(l without eyiJ d(•sign or intent (Pen.
Code, § 26) ; that ''Specific intent is an element of the offense

charged here, and this presents a question of fact which must
be proved like any other fact in the case'' ; that ''It is the
Jaw of this state that an act done in the absence of the will
is not any more the behavior of the actor than is an act done
<'ontrary to his will. If you believe beyond a reasonable doubt
and to a moral certainty that the defendant committed the act
charged in the indictment, and if you further believe from
the evidence that he was not coi1scious thereof and was not
acting while in full possession of his will and that he could
not formulate or hold the specific intent to commit the act
charged, or if, from the evidence herein, you entertain a
reasonable doubt that defendant was conscious at said time
and was not acting in full possession of his will and could not
formulate or hold the specific intent to commit the act
charged, then you should find him not guilty as to said indictment.'' We think the jury was adequately instructed that
defendant must be proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt
of every fact constituting the crime; the specific intent was
an element required and, specifically, that they must find beyond a reasonable doubt that he had the mental capacity to
form an intent. There were, therefore, instructions that intent must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
[21] Moreover, under the statute no instruction on reasonable doubt other than that specified in the Penal Code, section 1096 need be given (Pen. Code, § 1096a) and as said in
People v. Reed, 38 Cal.2d 423, 430 [240 P.2d 590], "The
court may couch its instructions defining the elements of the
offense in the language of the code where no instructions in
elaboration or exposition of the principles of the statutory
definitions are requested by tbe defendant. (People v.
Treschenko, 159 Cal. 456, 458 [114 P. 578] .) Even if such
an instruction 'cannot be commended as a. full or clear exposition of the meaning of the section of the code, still it
cannot be said that it was error for the court in giving the
law to have conformed to the language of the code, and to
have omitted what that code itself omits.' (PeopLe v. Dobbins,
138 Cal. 694, 698 [72 P. 339].) The defendant will not be
heard to complain where he has failed to request an amplifica40 C.2d-211
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tion of an instruction in that form. (People v. Laird, 69 Cal.
App. 511, 514 [231 P. 596] .)
''. . . The court's instruction on the presumption of innocence and defining reasonable doubt followed the language
of section 1096 of the Penal Code. By additional instructions,
the court explained the effect of the presumption and stated
the doctrine of reasonable doubt.
"These instructions, Reed complains, are only general. No
instruction was given to the effect that each element of the
crime must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. But the
law expressly specifies that the court may read section 1096
of the Penal Code and need not give any other instruction on
the presumption of innocence or reasonable doubt. (Pen.
Code, § 1096a.) Considering all of the instructions, it appears
that the jury was fully and fairly instructed as to all of the
rules of law applicable to the evidence.''
[22] Second, it is claimed that the instructions on torture
were in error. The instructions given were in the language
defining torture in Peop~e v. Martinez, supra, 38 Cal.2d 556,
561, and there is, therefore, no error.
[23] Third, complaint is made of instructions in the insanity stage of the trial. The court refused to give defendant's
instruction that he need not prove his insanity beyond a
reasonable doubt but need only prove it by a preponderance
of the evidence, defining the latter clause. In the insanity
stage of the trial the burden of proof rests on defendant to
prove his insanity by a preponderance of the evidence. (People
v. Hardy, 33 Cal.2d 52 [198 P.2d 865] and cases there cited.)
Hence defendant's offered instruction was correct. In connection with the court's refusal to give this instruction, defendant particularly complains of the instruction hereafter
to be mentioned.
[24] The jury was instructed that it was not to rely upon
any particular instruction but to take them as a whole; that
defendant was entitled to the full benefit of the defense of
insanity if it believed that the defense had been established
by a "preponderance of the evidence"; that it was the sole
judge of the evidence and credibility of witnesses; that it was
to give defendant the benefit of every reasonable doubt (this
should probably not have been given) ; that ''To the charge
of murder made against the defendant he has interposed the
plea ·of 'not guilty' and 'not guilty by reason of insanity.'
The law requires that where such pleas are entered, the defendant must first be tried under the general issue of 'not
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guilt_y', during which tr:ial he is conclusively presumed to
ha'Ve been legally sane at the time the offense is alleged to
have been committed; all evidence relating to the q_uestion of
legal sanity of. the accused being excluded, and, at the conclusion of such trial the defendant shall· be. tried 1lPO:il the
issue of legal insanity. Accordingly, in the present case, during
the first phase of this trial under the general issue of 'twt
guilty,' the defendant was conclusivel;v presumed to be sane,
and any evidence bearing upon the question of his legal sarrl,ty
was not relevant to that issue and you were precluded. by the
law from considering the question of the legal sanity of the
defendant on the first phase of this trial. The first phase of
this trial having resulted in a verdict (}f guilty, the defendant
is entitled under his plea of 'not guilty by reason of legal m·
sanity' to a trial upon that issue and to introduce any legal
evidence tending t.o establish. such plea.
"The defendant in this case .heretofore has been charged
with the crime of murder and has been found guilty of th~t
oil'ense, except in this respect: That defendant has entered a
plea of 'not guilty by reason of insanity', thereby alleging
that Jle was insane at the time of the commission of the offense. . . . The issue :raised by that plea of insanity .now
must be determined,, because the law does not hoM. a person
criminally accountable for his conduct if at the time th~:re9:f
he was insane." . ~nsanity was defined for the jury and it
was told that if it believed from a upreponderance'' of the
evidence that defendant was insane it should so find; that
''The. burden of proving insanity .is on ·the defendant; that
is to say, it is incumbent. upon him to establish by a pre·poi:lderance of evidence that he was insane. ·. . .
''.The law presum~ that the· defendant was. sane ..• That presumption may be rebutted but is controlling until overcome
by a preponderance of evidence. . . .
''.The rule requiring the de£endant, where insanity is interposed as a defense, to prove it by .. it preponderance of the
evil!ence does not affect the other· rule. that the ·burden of
proving·sanity is on the pl"osecution. The burden.has always
b~en .on the prosecution and is met .in the :first i11stance by
the :presumption of sanity which. the law rais~.s ~nd which
must prevail.until it is overcome, The rule relating to the def(lnse of insanity does not shift the burden of proof from
th~? People to the de:fend~nt, but only. shifts the burden. of
~trotincing evidence and declares. the amonp~. or quantum of
evidence which he must produce to overcome the presumption
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and show his insanity. The present status does not take away
the defense of insanity, and the procedure followed has in no
way changed or affected the rule respecting the burden which
rests on the prosecution and on the defense in this case.
"It follows, therefore, that the burden on the prosecution
of proving the sanity of the defendant at the time of the
commission of the crime of which he has been found guilty,
namely, murder of the first degree, beyond a reasonable doubt,
is met by the pr-esumption of sanity, and the bur-den of
establishing the defense of insanity of the defendant is upon
him, to establish such insanity at the time of the commission
of the crime of which he has been convicted, by a preponderance of the evidence," (emphasis added). Other instructions
referred to preponderance of the evidence and gave more
detailed definitions of insanity.
The italicized portion of the instructions, supra, is prejudicially erroneous, asserts defendant, because it in effect
told the jury that the prosecution had to prove sanity beyond
a reasonable doubt and that it had done so by the presumption
of sanity; that, therefore, in effect, defendant would have to
overcome a presumption of sanity beyond a reasonable .doubt
and that means more than by a preponderance of the evidence.
There is no doubt that the instruction is confusing and
should not have been given. However, it may reasonably be
interpreted to mean that even though the prosecution was
relieved of proving sanity beyond a reasonable doubt yet the
defendant could establish his insanity by a preponderance of
the evidence and that construction is clearly in harmony with
the other instructions on the subject that a preponderance
of the evidence was all defendant needed to produce.
[25] There has been considerable discussion with reference to the correct rule in regard to who carries the burden
in the sanity stage of the trial. (See 26 Cal.L.Rev. 543; 2 So.
Cal.L.Rev. 53; 3 ibid. 1; 21 Cal.L.Rev. 65; 26 Cal.L.Rev.
544.) It was held in People v. Hickman, 204 Cal. 470 [268
P. 909, 270 P. 1117], that the rule is the same now as it was
before the bifurcated trial provision which was enacted in the
1927 amendment to section 1026 of the Penal Code. In the
Hickman case, sttpra, it was held that a person is presumed
to be sane and ''The rule requiring the defendant, where insanity is interposed as a defense, to prove it by a prepondera11ce of the evidence, does not affect the other rule that the
burden of proving sanity is on the prosecution. That burden
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has always been on it and is met in the first instance by the
presumptiol'l of sanity which the Jaw raises and whiCh must
prevail until it is overcome. The rule relating' to the defense
of insanity does not shift the bm·den of proof from the People
to the defendant, but only shifts the burden of introducing
evidence and declares the amount or quantum of evidence
which he must produce to overcome the presumption and show
llis insanity. (People v. Harris, 169 Cal. 53, 68 [145 Pac.
520] .) " (People v. Hickman, supra, 204 Cal. 470, 477.) But
the cases also have stated that the burden is on the defendant to
prove insanity by a preponderance of the evidence. "There are
statements in a number of cases to the effect that in a separate
trial on the issue of sanity the defendant has the burden of
proving insanity by a preponderance of the evidence. (People
v. McLachlan, 13 Cal.2d 45, 55 [87 P.2d 825]; People v.
French, 12 Cal.2d 720, 734 [87 P.2d 1014] ; People v. Troche,
206 Cal. 35, 49 [273 P. 767] ; People v. Hickman, 204 Cal. 470,
477 [268 P. 909, 270 P. 1117] .) " (People v. Hardy, 33 Cal.2d
52, 65 [198 P.2d 865] .) 'l'hat is the more appropriate way to
instruct the jury.
[26] Defendant contends that the instructions on deliberation and intent were improper. The jury was instructed in
the language of sections 187-189 of the Penal Code, as to manslaughter and the degrees of murder, and as to murder of the
first degree. It was told that to constitute first degree murder
the killing must be by torture as defined, or wilful act accompanied by malice together with a clear and deliberate intent
to take life. It was told that the intent must be the result of
deliberation and must be formed on preexisting reflection and
not under heat of passion or such other condition as to preclude
deliberation. ''The law does not undertake to measure in units
of time the length of the period during which the thought
must be pondered before it can ripen into an intent to kill
which is truly deliberate and premeditated. The time will
vary with different individuals and under varying circumstances. The true test is not the duration of time, but rather
the extent of the reflection. 'rhoughts may follow each other
with great rapidity and a cold, calculated judgment and decision may be arrived at quickly. However, the express requirement for a concurrence of deliberation and premeditation
excludes from murder of the first degree those homicides not
specifically enumerated in the statutes. To constitute a deliberate and premeditated killing, the slayer must weigh and
consider the question of killing and the reasons for and
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against such a choice and, having in mind the consequences,
decide to and commit the unlawful act causing death. . . .
"The adjective 'deliberate' means formed, arrived at or determined upon as a result of careful thought and weighing
of considerations; as a deliberate judgment or plan; carried
on coolly and steadily, according to a preconceived design;
given to weighing facts and arguments with a view to a choice
or decision ; careful in considering the consequences of a step ;
unhurried; characterized by reflection; dispassionate; not
rash. The word 'deliberate' is an antonym of 'hasty, impetuous, rash, impulsive.'
"The verb 'premeditate' means 'to think on, and revolve
in the mind, beforehand; to contrive and design previously.'
''Thus, to find the defendant guilty of murder of the first
degree, you must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt and
to a moral certainty that the unlawful killing was accompanied with a deliberate and clear intention to take life. The
intent to kill must be the result of deliberate premeditation ;
it must be formed upon a pre-existing reflection, and not upon
a sudden heat of passion sufficient to preclude the idea of
deliberation. It is necessary that the act of killing be preceded by a concurrence of will, deliberation and premeditation on the part of the slayer." Those instructions satisfy the
requirements of the law as most recently stated by this
court. (People v. Carmen, 36 Cal.2d 768, 777-778 [228 P.2d
281].)
The judgment and order denying a motion for a new trial
are a:ffirmeP..
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., and
Spence, J., concurred.
Edmonds, J., concurred in the judgment.
Appellant's petition for a rehearing and modification was
denied May 28, 1953.

